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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




JAMES A. KESTING, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42875 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
STANLEYW. WELSH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
C. THOMAS ARKOOSH 




Time: 09:35 AM 
Page 1 of 6 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2014-00258 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
User: TCWEGEKE 









































































New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
Summons Filed 
Affidavit Of Service 01.09.2014 
Answer (James Pro Se) 








Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Patricia Young 
Judgment On The Pleadings 
Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion Patricia Young 
02/18/201411:00 AM) Motion for Judgment On 
Pleadings 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Patricia Young 
02/18/2014 11 :OO AM: Hearing Held Motion for 
Judgment On Pleadings 
Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees Patricia Young 
Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Patricia Young 
Pleadings 
Judgment $8000.00 Patricia Young 
Civil Disposition entered for: Kesting, James A, Patricia Young 
Defendant; Kesting, Linda C, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
2/28/2014 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
Affidavit Of Matt Schelstrate Re Interest 
Calculation For Writ 
Order for Attorney Fees and Costs 





Amended Affidavit of Matt Schelstrate re interest Patricia Young 
calculation for Writ of Execution 
Execution Issued - Ada Co. 
Sheriffs Return On Writ & Writ 





Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Application For Patricia Young 
Order For Debtor's Examination Of Defendant 
Sheriffs Return 04.07.14 Patricia Young 
Debtors Exam Issued (6/24/14@ 3:30 pm) Patricia Young 
Hearing Scheduled (Debtors Examination 
06/24/2014 03:30 PM) 
Patricia Young 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Patricia Young 
action 
Motion for entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Patricia Young 
Order 
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Date: 5/19/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 09:35 AM ROA Report 
Page2 of6 Case: CV-OC-2014-00258 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Date Code User Judge 
5/29/2014 AFSM CCMCLAPM Affidavit of Counsel In Support Of Plantiffs Motion Patricia Young 
for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
MEMO CCMCLAPM Supplematal Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Patricia Young 
Costs 
6/5/2014 NOHG CCMURPST Notice Of Hearing (06/24/2014 3:45 p.m.) Patricia Young 
HRSC CCMURPST Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/24/2014 03:45 Patricia Young 
AM) Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order 
6/12/2014 NOAP, CCTHIEKJ Notice Of Appearance (Arkoosh for James Patricia Young 
Kesting) 
6/17/2014 MOTN CCMARTJD Ex Parte Motion to Continue Patricia Young 
AFFD. CCMARTJD Affidavit in Support of Ex Parte Motion to Patricia Young 
Continue Hearing 
MOTN CCMARTJD Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time Patricia Young 
AFFD, CCMARTJD Affidavit in Support of Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Patricia Young 
Time 
MEMO CCHOLMEE Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Patricia Young 
QDRO 
6/18/2014 CONT CCPRICDL Continued (Motion 06/25/2014 01 :30 PM) Patricia Young 
Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order 
6/20/2014 MEMO CCMCLAPM Respondents Memorandum in Opposition to Patricia Young 
Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order 
6/23/2014 REPL, TCLAFFSD Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Patricia Young 
Entry Of Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
6/24/2014 HRHD CCPRICDL Hearing result for Debtors Examination scheduled Patricia Young 
on 06/24/2014 03:30 PM: Hearing Held 
6/25/2014 HRHD CCPRICDL Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Patricia Young 
06/25/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Plaintiffs 
Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order 
STAT CCPRICDL STATUS CHANGED: closed Patricia Young 
AFFD CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Nikeela Black in Support of Motion Patricia Young 
requesting Permission to File Objection to 
Petitioners Supplemental Memorandum for 
Attorney fees and costs 
CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Nikeela Black in Support of Motion Patricia Young 
requesting Permission to File Objection to 
Petitioners Supplemental Memorandum for 
Attorney fees and costs 
JDMT CCPRICDL Judgment on Qualified Domestic Relations Order Patricia Young 
6/26/2014 OBJT CCTHIEKJ Objection to Motion for Permission to File Patricia Young 
Objection to Petitioner's Supplemental Fees and 
Costs 
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Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Date Code User Judge 
7/2/2014 MEMO CCTHIEKJ Second Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Patricia Young 
Costs 
7/7/2014 OBJT CCREIDMA Objection to Petitioner's Supplemental Patricia Young 
Memorandum For Attorneys Fees and Second 
Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs; 
Motion to Disallow; and Affidavid of Attorney 
7/10/2014 APDC CCBARRSA Appeal Filed In District Court Patricia Young 
CAAP CCBARRSA Case Appealed: Patricia Young 
STAT CCBARRSA STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Patricia Young 
7/11/2014 CHGA CCBARRSA Judge Change: Administrative Gerald Schroeder 
NOTR CCBARRSA Notice Of Reassignment Gerald Schroeder 
7/16/2014 MOTN TCLAFFSD Motion For Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
MEMO TCLAFFSD Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Stay Of Gerald Schroeder 
Judgment Pending Appeal 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Nikeela Black in Support of Motion for Gerald Schroeder 
Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal 
NOTH CCRADTER Notice Of Hearing 8.19.14 @ 3 pm Patricia Young 
HRSC · CCRADTER Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Gerald Schroeder 
08/19/2014 03:00 PM) Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum for Attorney's Fees and Costs and 
Plaintiffs Second Memorandum for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs 
ESTM TCPAANMR Estimate Of Appeal Transcript Cost Gerald Schroeder 
7/22/2014 NOHG CCTHIEKJ Notice Of Hearing (8-12-14@ 3:00pm) Gerald Sch reeder 
HRSC CCTHIEKJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/12/2014 03:00 Gerald Schroeder 
PM) Motion for Stay of Juddgment Pending 
Appeal 
7/23/2014 AFFD TCMEREKV Affidavit Of James Kesting In Support Of Motion Gerald Schroeder 
For Stay Of Judgment Pending Appeal 
7/24/2014 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Waive Transcripts on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
MOTN CCGARCOS Motion to Waive Transcript on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
ORDR CCNELSRF Order Waiving Transcript on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
ORDR CCNELSRF Order Governing Proceedure on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
8/5/2014 OBJE CCRADTER Objection to Motion For Stay of Judgment Gerald Schroeder 
Pending Appeal 
8/7/2014 MISC TCMEREKV Response To Objection To Motion For Stay Of Gerald Schroeder 
Judgment Pending Appeal 
8/13/2014 HRHD CCPRICDL Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Patricia Young 
08/12/2014 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion for 
Stay of Juddgment Pending Appeal 
8/19/2014 DECL TCLAFFSD Declaration Of Counsel In Support of Plaintiffs Gerald Schroeder 
Supplemental Memorandum And Second 
Memorandum For Attorney's Fees 
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Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Date Code User Judge 
8/19/2014 HRHD CCPRICDL Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Patricia Young 
on 08/19/2014 03:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs and Plaintiff's Second 
Memorandum for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
8/27/2014 JDMT CCPRICDL Judgment $1859.50 Gerald Schroeder 
ORDR CCPRICDL Order for Attorney Fees Gerald Schroeder 
8/28/2014 ORDR CCRADTER Order Granting Stay of Judgment of Qualified Gerald Schroeder 
Domestic Relations Order 
ORDR CCRADTER Order for Attorney's Fees Gerald Schroeder 
JDMT CCRADTER Judgment for Attorney's Fees $2498 Gerald Schroeder 
CDIS CCRADTER Civil Disposition entered for: Kesting, James A, Gerald Schroeder 
Defendant; Kasting, Linda C, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
8/28/2014 
STAT CCRADTER STATUS CHANGED: Closed Gerald Schroeder 
BREF, CCRADTER Appellant's Brief Gerald Schroeder 
9/25/2014 BREF CCTHIEKJ Respondent's Brief Gerald Schroeder 
MOTN CCMURPST Motion to Augment the Record Gerald Schroeder 
AFFD CCMURPST Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Gerald Schroeder 
Augment the Record 
9/30/2014 OBJE TCMEREKV Objection To Petitioner's Motion To Augment The Gerald Schroeder 
Record 
10/1/2014 HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Gerald Schroeder 
10/16/2014 02:00 PM) Objection to Motion to 
Augment 
CCNELSRF Notice of Hearing Gerald Schroeder 
10/9/2014 RSPN CCHEATJL Response To Objection To Motion To Augment Gerald Schroeder 
Record 
10/16/2014 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Gerald Schroeder 
on 10/16/2014 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: c. valcich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages Objection to 
Motion to Augment 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
11/20/2014 01 :30 PM) 
CCNELSRF Notice of Hearing 11/20 @1 :30 Gerald Schroeder 
BREF CCWATSCL Appellant's Reply Brief Gerald Schroeder 
10/22/2014 NOSV CCBOYIDR Notice Of Service Gerald Schroeder 
11/5/2014 CONT CCNELSRF Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
12/04/2014 01 :30 PM) 
CCNELSRF Amended Notice of Hearing 12/04/@ 1:30 Gerald Schroeder 
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Page 5 of 6 Case: CV-OC-2014-00258 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Date Code User Judge 
12/4/2014 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
scheduled on 12/04/2014 01:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 
12/9/2014 NOTS CCRADTER Notice Of Service Gerald Schroeder 
12/29/2014 DEOP CCNELSRF Opinion on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
CDIS CCNELSRF Civil Disposition entered for: Kesting, James A, Gerald Schroeder 
Defendant; Kesting, Linda C, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
12/29/2014 
STAT CCNELSRF STATUS CHANGED: Closed Gerald Schroeder 
1/7/2015 NOTA CCJOHNLE NOTICE OF APPEAL Gerald Schroeder 
APSC CCJOHNLE Appealed To The Supreme Court Gerald Schroeder 
2/10/2015 MOTN CCHOLDKJ Motion for Order Restraining Transfer of Property Gerald Schroeder 
Subject to Pending Appeal 
DECL: CCHOLDKJ Declaration of Counsel Gerald Schroeder 
2/11/2015 NOHG CCHOLDKJ Notice Of Hearing (2.26.15@1 :30pm) Gerald Schroeder 
HRSC· CCHOLDKJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/26/2015 01 :30 Gerald Schroeder 
PM) motion for Order Restraining Transfer of 
Property Subject Pending Appeal 
STAT CCHOLDKJ STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Gerald Schroeder 
action 
2/19/2015 RSPS' CCMYERHK Response To Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion For Gerald Schroeder 
Order Restraining Transfer Of Property Subject 
To Pending Appeal 
AFFD CCMYERHK Affidavit Of James Kesting Re: Gerald Schroeder 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion For Order Restraining 
Transfer Of Property Subject To Pending Appeal 
2/25/2015 HRVC CCNELSRF Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Gerald Schroeder 
02/26/2015 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated motion 
for Order Restraining Transfer of Property 
Subject Pending Appeal 
STAT CCNELSRF STATUS CHANGED: closed Gerald Schroeder 
3/10/2015 MOTN TCHOLLJM Motion For Order For Examination Gerald Schroeder 
AFSM TCHOLLJM Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Order For Gerald Schroeder 
Examination 
3/17/2015 DEBI CCREIDMA Debtors Exam Issued and filed (5/26/15 @ 2:30 Gerald Schroeder 
PM) 
HRSC CCREIDMA Hearing Scheduled (Debtors Examination Gerald Schroeder 
05/26/2015 02:30 PM) 
STAT CCREIDMA STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Gerald Schroeder 
action 
4/16/2015 AFOS TCMEREKV Affidavit Of Service 4.12.15 Gerald Schroeder 
4/28/2015 MOTN CCMYERHK Motion To Set Aside Service Of Process Gerald Schroeder 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2014-00258 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Linda C Kesting vs. James A Kesting 
Date Code User 
4/28/2015 AFFD CCMYERHK Affidavit Of James A Kesting In Support Of 
Motion To Set Aside Service Of Process 
MEMO CCMYERHK Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Set Aside 
Service Of Process 








JAN~ 7 2014 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE RUDZINSKI 
STANLEY W. WELSH ISB #1964 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
800 PARK BL VD., STE. 790 
BOISE, ID 83712 
PO Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83707-9518 
Telephone (208) 344-7811 
Facsimile (208) 338-3290 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LINDA C. KESTING, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV QC 14 Q 0'2 5 8 
V. COMPLAINT 
JAMES A. KESTING, Fee Category: A $96.00 
Defendant. 
The above named Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows: 
I 
The parties entered into a contract requmng Defendant to pay to Plaintiff 
alimony/spousal support. 
II 
Pursuant to the terms of their contract, Defendant is obligated to pay to Plaintiff the sum 
of $1,600 on the first day of each month. 
COMPLAINT· P.l 
SWW/rfl 20852-003/1043882 1/7/14 Jl:53:17 AM 
(.:) 
::t, --




Defendant has failed to pay the spousal support of $1,600 due October 1, 2013, $1,600 
due November 1, 2013, $1,600 due on December 1, 2013, and $1,600 due January 1, 2013, for a 
total amount of $6,400. 
IV 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Defendant is obligated to pay the attorney fees and 
costs incurred by Plaintiff in this action. If this matter is not contested, Defendant should be 
ordered to pay to Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $1,000. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. For a Judgment against Defendant in the amount of $6,400. 
2. For an award of attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 if this matter is not contested. 
Attorney fees are being sought pursuant to the terms of the contract between the 
parties. 
3. For all costs incurred by Plaintiff in this action. 
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this ~ day of January, 2014. 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
( 
STAN~. WELSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
COMPLAINT- P.2 
SWW/rfl 20852-003/1043882 1/7/14 11 :53: 17 AM 
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. . • 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IPAHO ) 
:ss. 
County·of Ada ) 
Linda C. Kesting, being first duly sworn on oath, det,oses and says: 
That she js the Plaintiff in the above entitled action. That she has read the within and 
foregoing Complaint; knows the contents thereof; and that the fac~ therein s~ted are true as she 
verily believes. 
~d~ llidat.Keilting . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this J::!. day of January, 2014. 
• 
STEVE KLOBERDANZ· 
. Notary Public • Arizona 
PIJIII COUj1ly 
My Comm. Expirn Aug 24, 2014 
COMPLAINT· P.3 





James A. Kesting 
2508 N Elk Cove Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Telephone (208) 559-4244 
Defendant 
• :~·:::::===Fl=~=-M__,~....._.,~:o'.""IF"l"s-
JAN 2 4 2014 
CHRISIOftHER 0. RJCH, Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LINDA C. KESTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES A. KESTING, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1400258 
ANSWER 
Fee Category: __ _ 
Filing Fee: $ ___ _ 
The above named Defendant for his Answer to the allegations in the case on file herein, states: 




CIVIL CASE ANSWER 
CAO CvPi 3-2 3/10/2011 
PAGE1 
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2. I admit the portion of paragraph IV that states: "Pursuant to the terms of the contract, 
Defendant is obligated to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by plaintiff in this 
action. 
3. I deny the portion of paragraph IV that states: "If this matter is not contested, Defendant 
should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $1000." because I do 
not have enough information to admit or deny it. 
I swear I have read this Answer and state that all facts included are true. 
I ask the Court to enter any order requested above. 
/ / .. )~ ~L/ 
Date: _......_f -+f-~ __ /_,_r ___ _ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
CIVIL CASE ANSWER 
CAO CvPi 3-2 3/10/2011 
/1T -.. .. 1 
Sfgnatore of Defendant 
C,/ 
J;)3~dayof -/~aA/).1, 2ol~ 
p 
-
Notary Public ft::: 
Residing at d5 o~~ ~, Z> 




I • f 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on 23m day of January, 20141 served a copy to: 
StanleyW. Welsh 
Cosho Humphrey, LLP 
800 Park Blvd., STE 790 
Boise, ID 83712 
James A. Kesting 
CIVIL CASE ANSWER 
CAO CvPi 3-2 3/10/2011 
~ Bymail 
D By fax (number) _______ _ 
D By personal delivery 
$ignature 




STANLEY W. WELSH ISB #1964 
MATT SCHELSTRATE ISB #8276 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
800 PARK BL VD., STE. 790 
BOISE, ID 83712 
PO Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83 707-9518 
Telephone (208) 344-7811 
Facsimile (208) 338-3290 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
e 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LINDA C. KESTING, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JAMES A. KESTING, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1400258 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
The above-captioned matter came before this court on February 18, 2014. Plaintiff 
appeared through her attorney, Matt Schelstrate. Defendant appeared in person. 
BASED UPON the hearing of this matter, the evidence submitted, and good cause 
appearing therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. 
2. Plaintiff is directed to submit a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees for 
the Court's consideration. 
000015
• 
DATED This~ day of February, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the '21._ day of February, 2014, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
James "Jay" A. Kesting 
2508 N. Elk Cove Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 




\ < • 
STANLEY W. WELSH ISB #1964 
MATT SCHELSTRA TE ISB #8276 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
800 PARK BLVD., STE. 790 
BOISE, ID 83712 
PO Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83 707-9518 
Telephone (208) 344-7811 
Facsimile (208) 338-3290 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LINDA C. KESTING, 
V. 
JAMES A. KESTING, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1400258 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant in the amount of $8,000.00, together with post-
judgment interest allowed by law from the date of this Judgment. 
DATED Thi~ day of February, 2014. 
(]; 
JUDGMENT P -1-
SWW/mbs 20852-003/1066781 2/19/14 12:46:16 PM 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the ··{b day of February, 2014, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
James "Jay" A. Kesting 
2508 N. Elk Cove Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Served by: U. S. Mail 
JUDGMENT P -2-




M~R \ \ Z~,14 
~ C()\)t'li'i 
• 
STANLEY W. WELSH ISB #1964 
MATT SCHELSTRA TE ISB #8276 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
800 PARK BL VD., STE. 790 
BOISE, ID 83712 
Telephone (208) 344-7811 
Facsimile (208) 338-3290 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
• NO·-----,,,,...,,,,,..----
FILED .JJO A.M. ____ ,P.M. ___ _ 
MAR 2 7 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MIKE TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LINDA C. KESTING, 
V. 
JAMES A. KESTING, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1400258 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUGED that a Judgment be entered in favor of 
Plaintiff, Linda C. Kesting, against Defendant, James A. Kesting, in the amount of $1,227.80, 
together with post-judgment interest allowed by law from the date of this Judgment. 
DATED This_!{_ day of March, 2014. 
JUDGMENT P -1-
SWW/mbs 208S2-003/1066781 3/7/14 1:30:59 PM 
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• • • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on theJ:]day of.March, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
James "Jay" A. Kesting 
2508 N. Elk Cove Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
Served by: U.S. Mail 
JUDGMENT P -2-
SWW/mbs 20852-003/1066781 3/7/14 1:30:59 PM 
Matt Schelstrate 
Stanley W. Welsh 
Cosho Humphrey, LLP 
PO Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83707-951§,,,,,, ... ,,,,,,,,, 
Served bJ: U. S~ 81 4TH J{JIJ ',,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. ~/~· .. •~•·•·{~'\ 
: f....., ;of TIil! •f ,4 ~' ,:"". ~ •.  c, .• 
·~i\ •OF ·.OJi"'l';: ~ . ~ . : ~~. 
000020
• 
NO.,., , = 
AM. __ , ... ._ • ~~.~.: 9 
JUN 2 5 2014 
= 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DE:P:DRE PRICE 
STANLEY W. WELSH ISB #1964 
MATT SCHELSTRA TE ISB #8276 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
800 PARK BL VD., STE. 790 
BOISE, ID 83712 
PO BOX 9518 
BOISE, ID 83707-9518 
Telephone (208) 344-7811 
Facsimile (208) 338-3290 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
LINDA C. KESTING, 
V. 
JAMES A. KESTING, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1400258 
JUDGMENT OF QUALIFIED 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER 
DEPUTY 
This Order is intended to be a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO"), as that term 
is defined in§ 206(d) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and§ 
414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Code"). This QDRO is granted in accordance 
with applicable state domestic relations laws which relate to marital property rights, child 
support, and/or spousal support between spouses and former spouses in matrimonial actions. 
The purpose of this Qualified Domestic Relations Order is to satisfy pending judgments for 
alimony owed by the Participant to the Alternate Payee. 





SECTION 1. IDENTIFICATION OF PLAN 
This Order applies to benefits under the J.P. Morgan Terteling Employees Profit 
Sharing and Thrift Savings Plan ("Plan"). 
SECTION 2. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTICIPANT AND AL TERNA TE 
PAYEE 
a. The "Participant" is James A. Kesting. The Participant's last known mailing 
address is 2508 N. Elk Cove Way, Meridian, Idaho 83646. The Participant's social security 
number and date of birth are included on the separate addendum and not incorporated as part of 
this order. 
b. The "Alternate Payee" is Linda C. Kesting. The Alternate Payee's last known 
mailing address is 1827 E. Angelica Drive, Casa Grande, Arizona 84122. The Alternate Payee's 
social security number and date of birth are included on the separate addendum and not 
incorporated as part of this order. The Alternate Payee is the former spouse of the Participant. 
SECTION 3. AMOUNT OF BENEFIT TO BE PAID TO AL TERNA TE 
PAYEE 
The Alternate Payee and the Participant were divorced by this Court on July 31, 2009. 
Incident to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the parties entered into a contract for the 
payment of alimony. Because of the breach of the Participant and failure to pay as required, the 
Plaintiff/Alternate Payee was granted a Judgment dated February 28, 2014 in the amount of 
$8,000, including interest at the statutory rate of 5 .250% or $1.15 per day until paid. Interest 
accrued on the February 28, 2014 judgment is $103.50 as of May 29, 2014. The total amount 
due on the February 28, 2014 judgment as of May 29, 2014 is $8,103.50. Plaintiff/Alternate 





Payee was also granted a Judgment for fees incurred seeking to collect unpaid alimony against 
the Participant on March 27, 2014 for $1,277.80, including interest at the rate of 5.250% for a 
total of $.18 per day. Interest accrued on the March 27, 2014 Judgment is $11.34 as of May 29, 
2014. The total amount due on the March 27, 2014 Judgment as of May 29, 2014 is $1,239.14. 
The total amount due on both of these outstanding judgments as of May 29, 2014 is $9,342.64. 
Therefore, the Alternate Payee is hereby assigned an interest in and entitled to receive the 
amount of $9,342.64 of the Participant's vested account balance as of May 29, 2014. The 
Alternate Payee's interest shall be satisfied by a lump sum payment of the amount awarded or by 
transferring pro rata by fund and source (excluding the Participant's loan fund, if any) such 
interest to a separate account under the Plan on behalf of the Alternate Payee, which is allowed 
under the Plan 
The Alternate Payee is also entitled to earnings, gains and losses on the specified amount 
from the valuation date of May 29, 2014, until such amount is transferred into an account for the 
Alternate Payee. Earnings, gains and losses for the period of time from the account separation 
date in the QDRO to the date of actual segregation of funds between Participant and Alternate 
Payee will be calculated by prorating dividends and unrealized gains and losses. 
If the Participant's account balance in the Plan includes an outstanding loan balance, the 
loan will remain an asset of the Participant's accounts. The amount of such outstanding loan 
balance will not be included in the Participant's total account balance for purposes of determining 
the Alternate Payee's interest. 
SECTION 4. FORM AND COMMENCEMENT OF PAYMENT 
The Alternate Payee may elect to receive payment from the Plan of benefits assigned to 
the Alternate Payee under this Order in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the 
Plan to the Participant, other than in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity with 





respect to the Alternate Payee and his or her subsequent spouse, if any, but only if the form 
elected complies with the minimum distribution requirements of§ 401(a)(9) of the Code. 
Payments to the Alternate Payee pursuant to this Order shall be in accordance with the 
Plan terms and commence as soon as practicable after this Order has been determined to be a 
qualified domestic relations order, and upon receipt of the Alternate Payee's properly completed 
benefit election form. 
SECTION 5. DEATH OF PARTICIPANT 
Any amounts assigned to the Alternate Payee under this Order shall not be affected by the 
Participant's death. 
SECTION 6. DEA TH OF AL TERNA TE PA YEE 
If the Alternate Payee dies prior to receiving her share of the Participant's account balance 
assigned to such Alternate Payee under the terms of this Order, the Alternate Payee's share shall 
be made to a beneficiary designated by the Alternate Payee on a form approved by the Plan. In 
the absence of a designated beneficiary, the Alternate Payee's share shall be paid based on the 
terms of the Plan. 
SECTION 7. INVESTMENT DIRECTION, LOANS AND HARDSHIP 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
To the extent permitted by the Plan, the Alternate Payee shall be permitted to direct 
investment of her separate interest to the same extent as the Participant is entitled to direct the 
investment of his account balances. To the extent not inconsistent with the terms of the Plan, the 
Alternate Payee shall not be eligible for hardship distributions or loans. 





SECTION 8. CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT 
In the event that the plan trustee inadvertently pays to the Participant any benefits that are 
assigned to the Alternate Payee pursuant to the terms of this Order, the Participant shall 
immediately reimburse the Alternate Payee to the extent that he has received such benefit 
payments, and shall forthwith pay such amounts so received directly to the Alternate Payee 
within ten (10) days ofreceipt. 
In the event the plan trustee inadvertently pays to the Alternate Payee any benefits that 
were assigned to the Participant pursuant to the terms of this Order, the Alternate Payee shall 
reimburse the Plan, to the extent that he/she has received such overpayment, within ten (10) days 
of receipt of such notice of overpayment. 
SECTION 9. COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS 
The parties to this order intend that it comply with applicable provisions of ERISA and 
the Code. Nothing in this Order shall require the Plan: 
a. To provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided 
under the Plan; 
b. To provide increased benefits ( determined on the basis of actuarial value); and 
c. To pay benefits to any Alternate Payee that are required to be paid to another 
Alternate Payee under another Order previously determined to be a qualified 
domestic relations order. 
SECTION 10. TAX TREATMENT OF BENEFITS TO ALTERNATE PAYEE 
Any benefit payment to the Alternate Payee pursuant to this QDRO shall be taxable to the 
Alternate Payee as provided in Sections 72 and 402 of the Code, and shall not be taxable to the 
Participant. Determination and allocation of the Participant's investment in the Plan, if any, shall 
be made in accordance with the provisions of Section 72(m)(l0) of the Code. 
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SECTION 11. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION 
The Court reserves jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter to amend this 
Order to establish and maintain its status as a QDRO under ERISA and the Code. 
IT IS SO ORDERED: 
The Honorable Patricia 
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' • County of Ada, the Honorable Patricia G. Young presiding. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
J runes Kesting (hereinafter, "J runes") brings this appeal of the Magistrate Court's award of a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order on June 25, 2014. Specifically, Judge Young erred as a matter 
oflaw in granting Linda Kesting's (hereinafter, "Linda") Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order because (1) the contract between Jrunes and Linda Kesting is a civil contract, not a 
Spousal Support Order, and (2) Idaho State law does not allow money judgment creditors to execute 
collection of judgments from exempt retirement accounts. Accordingly, James respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate the Qualified Domestic Relations Order. 
B. Factual Background and Procedural History 
James and Linda Kesting were married for thirty years. They divorced in 2009. In the 
divorce, the parties agreed that J runes would be awarded his 401 (k) account and that Linda would be 
awarded the marital residence, each party would take their respective bank accounts, and they would 
remain joint owners of the timeshare condo in Hawaii. The parties also entered into a separate 
settlement contract, which was not attached to the Decree. The contract expressly stated that J runes 
would make monthly payments to Linda of $1,600. In the fall of 2013, Jrunes lost his job and fell 
behind on those payments. 
On or about January 7, 2014, Linda filed a collection action to collect the unpaid monthly 
payments. Linda was represented by her current counsel of record. J runes did not retain counsel, and 
submitted an Answer to the Complaint,pro se on January 24, 2014. A Judgment for $8,000.00 was 
entered against Jrunes on February 28, 2014. A Writ of Execution was issued on April 3, 2014. The 
writ was returned unexecuted on April 28, 2014. Linda filed a Motion for Entry of Qualified 
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Domestic Relations Order on May 29, 2014. A Debtor's Examination of James was conducted on 
June 24, 2014. An order granting the Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Order was 
entered on June 25, 2014. James filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal to stay the 
execution of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order, which was granted on August 13, 2014. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Judge Young erred as a matter of law by treating James and Linda Kesting's 
separate civil contract as a Spousal Support Order; 
2. Whether Judge Young erred as a matter oflaw by granting a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order to a money judgment creditor in violation of state and federal law; and, 
3. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney costs and fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-
123. 
III. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
When a District Judge considers an appeal from a Magistrate Judge, the District Judge is 
acting as an Appellate Court, not as a Trial Court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 
1308 (1992); I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l ). Accordingly, the standards ofreview are the same as those applied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeal in a regular appeal: the District Court upholds the 
lower court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence; 
and affirms conclusions oflaw which demonstrate proper application oflegal principles to the facts 
found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194 (Ct. App. 1988). Where issues on appeal involve 
questions oflaw, a reviewing court exercises free review. Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 
120 Idaho 185, 814 P.2d 917 (1991). 




A. James and Linda Kesting Entered into a Separate Civil Contract Which is Not a 
Spousal Support Order. 
In July 2009, James and Linda drafted and signed a contract in which James agreed to make 
monthly payments to Linda for life. It was a separate contract; in paragraph two it expressly stated 
"This shall remain a separate contract and does not constitute a court order." [Emphasis added]. The 
fact that the contract was titled Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement is irrelevant, it is not a valid 
support order because it was never reviewed, approved, entered by a court, and the parties expressly 
stated in the contract that it was not a court order. 
When a spousal support obligation arises only from a settlement agreement, the right to 
enforce the spousal support obligation rests on the contract. Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 393-
94, 957 P.2d 1387, 1391-92 (1998); Spencer-Steedv. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338,344, 766 P.2d 1219, 
1225 (1988); Roesbery v. Roesbery, 88 Idaho 514, 521, 401 P.2d 805, 809 (1965); Kimball v. 
Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 16,356 P.2d 919,922 (1960);Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 75 Idaho 13, 23-24, 
265 P.2d 662, 669 (1954); Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 444-45, 958 P.2d 599, 601-02 
(Ct.App.1998). However, when a settlement agreement is incorporated, or "merged," into a divorce 
decree, the agreement becomes enforceable only as part of the decree, and not as a separate contract. 
Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,386,462 P.2d 49, 51 (1969); Kimball, 83 Idaho at 16,356 P.2d at 
922; Barnedt v. Wilder, 137 Idaho 415, 418, 49 P.3d 1265, 1268 (Ct.App.2002). As stated in 
Kimball, 83 Idaho at 15, 356 P.2d at 921, "Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under the 
judgment or the decree for those under the agreement or cause of action sued upon." In other words, 
when an agreement is merged into a divorce decree, it becomes part of the final order of the court. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF-Page 3 
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The right to enforce the separate contract through an action for breach of contract is supplanted by 
the divorce court's authority to enforce its orders, property division, child support, and spousal 
maintenance. If a settlement agreement has been merged, the spousal support provisions generally 
may be judicially modified by the court of original jurisdiction. LC. § 7-1015; Barley v. Smith, 149 
Idaho 171, 177,233 P.3d 102, 108 (2010); Keeler, 131 Idaho at 444-45, 958 P.2d at 601-02. 
In.the past, courts looked at the intent of the parties and the court at the time of the divorce to 
determine whether an agreement between the parties was merged into a divorce decree. E.g., 
Roesbery, 88 Idaho at 518,401 P.2d at 807. Under the intent test, the actual incorporation of the 
terms of the agreement into a divorce decree or physical attachment of the agreement usually, but not 
always, resulted in a finding that the agreement was merged, while language in a decree indicating 
an " 'approval,' 'ratification,' or 'confirmation' of the agreement by the court [was held] not 
sufficient to denote merger." Phillips, 93 Idaho at 3 87, 462 P .2d at 52. That approach of determining 
whether an agreement was incorporated by looking, first and foremost, at the intent of the parties 
was abandoned in Phillips. There, the Court reasoned that the difficulty of "ascribing such an intent 
to laymen" forced courts to "indulge in technical hair splitting." Id. at 386,462 P .2d at 51. The Court 
recognized that application of the test produced inconsistent results, and therefore the Court in 
Phillips announced a new rule as follows: 
[W]hen parties enter into an agreement of separation in contemplation of divorce and 
thereafter the agreement is presented to a district court in which a divorce action is 
pending and the court is requested to approve, ratify or confirm the agreement, 
certain presumptions arise. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary, it will be presumed that ... the agreement is merged into the decree of 
divorce, [and] is enforceable as a part thereof .... 
Id. at 387,462 P.2d at 52. See also, Keeler, 131 Idaho at 445,958 P.2d at 602. 
More recently, our Supreme Court explained that under the Phillips rule: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 4 
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The proper analysis is to look first only to the four corners of the divorce decree. If 
the language of the decree clearly and unambiguously holds the property settlement 
agreement is not merged, the inquiry is at an end. The court's inquiry will move 
beyond the four corners of the decree to the property settlement agreement only 
when the decree is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations. 
Borley, 149 Idaho at 177,233 P.3d at 108. 
Thus, according to the standard articulated in Phillips and Borley, when the divorce decree is 
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is not a material issue to the determination of whether an 
agreement was merged. 
Here, the Kesting's divorce decree unambiguously states that spousal support is "governed 
by a separate contract between the parties which is not part of this Decree and is not modifiable by 
this court." The parties in this case expressly stated their desire that the contract not be merged, 
incorporated, or otherwise connected with the Decree of Divorce. Additionally, as mentioned above, 
the separate contract also includes a provision stating that it is a separate contract and not a court 
order. There is no evidence it was ever presented to the court for judicial approval or entry, or that it 
was ever the desire of the parties to have a spousal support order entered by the court. Therefore, 
regardless of the title of the document, it is not a court order. It was not attached to the Decree of 
Divorce, nor was it ever approved or entered by a court. Spousal support orders are issued by a court, 
and generally modifiable by that court. In this case the parties expressly stated that the court would 
not have jurisdiction over the contract; it is nothing more than a standard payment contract between 
the parties, and as such, subject to traditional contract law. 
B. A Money Judgment Creditor is Not Entitled to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to 
Access Qualified Accounts Protected Under ERISA. 
In January 2014, Linda filed an action to collect based on the contract between the parties, 
not as an action to enforce a court ordered support order. A money judgment was issued based on 
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breach of contract by James' failure to make the monthly payments. Consistent with a money 
judgment, a writ of execution was issued. It was returned unexecuted, however, due to James' lack 
of assets. Linda then motioned the court to enter a Qualified Domestic Relations Order which would 
allow her access to James' only asset, his 401(k) account, a qualified retirement plan, which is 
generally exempt from collection actions. 
Commencing in the 1970s, a trend in the law began to develop towards recognizing benefits 
from retirement plans, including pension and profit sharing plans, collectively "retirement plans," as 
marital assets and as community property in community property states subject to distribution in 
dissolution of marriage cases. The principle espoused in the majority of cases was that retirement 
rights are a form of deferred compensation received in lieu of higher compensation which would 
otherwise have been received by the parties during the marriage. 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), governs qualified 
retirement plans. ERISA sets standards for such plans with respect to participation, vesting, benefit 
accrual, and funding. ERISA, however, also provides that qualified retirement plan benefits cannot 
be alienated or assigned, and that ERISA provisions preempt all other state law. I.R.C. 
§401(a)(13)(A). Hence, a state court's attempt to distribute funds in retirement plans conflict with 
the provisions of ERISA. 
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) was enacted to resolve the growing conflict 
between ERIS A and state law allowing for distribution of retirement rights in qualified plans upon 
dissolution of marriage. REA added I.R.C. §414(p) to the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §414(p) 
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permits the creation, assignment and recognition of any right in certain eligible retirement plans of a 
participant only through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. 1 
To be a "qualified plan" under REA, a plan must be an employee retirement plan which 
complies with the requirements of ERIS A and the Internal Revenue Code so as to allow tax deferral 
to employees of monies set aside for their retirement. See I.R.C. §401(a). 
Internal Revenue Code §414(p) defines "domestic relations order" as: 
... any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement 
agreement) which-
(i) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or martial 
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a 
participant, and 
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law ... 
Internal Revenue Code §414(p). [Emphasis added.] 
In order to qualify as a Domestic Relations Order, it must relate to a valid support order made 
pursuant to state domestic relations law. In Idaho, the state law governing support orders is Idaho 
Code §32-705 which states in pertinent part that: 
1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance order it if finds 
that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
a. Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and 
b. Is unable to support himself or herself through employment. 
LC. §32-705. 
Several courts have considered when QDROs are allowed to be granted after divorce decree. 
In each of the states where a party has been able to obtain a QDRO after the date of divorce, there 
have been two things present: 
1 Although it is stated above "only through a QDRO," the court in Ameritrust Company, N.A. v. Derakhshan, 830 
F .Supp. 406 (N.D. Ohio 1993), held that tax levies by the United States were valid against the participant's qualified plan 
notwithstanding the anti-alienation provisions ofERISA. InAmeritrust, the Wife had a QDRO from a state court which 
assigned the Husband's plan to her. However, the tax liens took precedence because they have priority in time. 
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1. A valid order from the magistrate court for child or spousal support, either by judicial 
order or by judicially approved settlement agreement, and 
2. State law providing a support order exception allowing retirement accounts to be accessed 
to satisfy support judgments. 
Since ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments, state 
law methods for collecting money generally remain undisturbed by ERISA; otherwise there would 
be no way to enforce a judgment won against an ERISA plan. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 
486 U.S. 825, 833-34, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988). 
State law in Idaho does not allow money judgment creditors to access retirement accounts. 
Idaho Code§ 11-604A governs pension money exemptions. LC. § 11-604A(3) states: 
The right of a person to a pension, annuity, or retirement allowance or disability 
allowance, or death benefits, or any optional benefit, or any other right accrued or 
accruing to any citizen of the state of Idaho under any employee benefit plan, and 
any fund created by the benefit plan or arrangement, shall be exempt from execution, 
attachment, garnishment, seizure, or other levy by or under any legal process 
whatever. This subsection shall not apply to any child support collection actions, if 
otherwise permitted by federal law. This subsection shall permit benefits under any 
such plan or arrangement to be payable to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other 
dependent of a participant in the plan to the extent expressly provided for in a 
qualified domestic relations order that meets the requirements for those orders under 
the plan, or, in the case ofbenefits payable under a plan described in sections 403(b ), 
408, 408A or 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or section 409 
of the Internal Revenue Code as in effect before January 1, 1984, to the extent 
provided in any order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that provides for 
maintenance or support. This subsection shall not prohibit actions against an 
employee benefit plan or fund for valid obligations incurred by the plan or fund for 
the benefit of the plan or fund. 
LC.§ 11-604A.2 [Emphasis added.] 
2 In a brief filed by Linda she argues that LC. § 11-607 is the appropriate statute. However, LC.§ 11-607 is 
irrelevant because it only governs claims against exempt property "notwithstanding other provisions of this act" LC. 
§ 11-604A was not part of the same act, and therefore not affected by I.C. § 11-607. 
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While the statute does allow for the use of a QDRO along the same lines as the federal law, it 
also follows the federal law by expressly stating, "to the extent provided in any order issued by a 
court of competent jurisdiction that provides for maintenance or support." Id. [Emphasis added.] 
Clearly, both federal and state law require that prior to separating qualified retirement funds 
in order to pay a Judgment, the Judgment itself must be to collect support payments generated from a 
valid child or spousal support order. In this case, the separate contract between the parties was not 
approved, merged, or otherwise ordered by the court, it is not a spousal support order. Throughout 
the collection action Linda has sought to treat the contract as either a separate civil contract or a 
spousal support order depending on what is more favorable to her position. Spousal support orders 
are generally modifiable by the court that issued them. Linda wants the best of both worlds; she does 
not want the court to be able to review and modify the contract relating to her monthly payments, as 
it would be able to do if it was a spousal support order, yet she wants the court to treat it like a 
spousal support order when requesting a QDRO to collect on the contract. 
Granting a QDRO allowing Linda to attach her money judgment to funds within James' 
401(k) account effectually alters the original divorce decree, which is not permitted in Idaho. In 
DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So.2d 63 7, 638 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998), the court determined a QDRO had 
been improperly entered where the dissolution judgment had awarded the husband the interest in his 
pension plan, and awarded the wife the interest in hers. The trial court entered the QDRO to attach 
assets in the wife's pension plan after the wife failed to make a court-ordered cash payment to the 
husband. The appellate court reversed: "To order a QDRO on the wife's pension plan is to create an 
interest in that asset which the final judgment extinguished. That is tantamount to a modification of 
the final adjudication of property rights in a divorce case, which is not permitted." Id. 
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Similarly, in Hoy v. Hoy, 29 Va.App. 115, 510 S.E.2d 253 (1999) a divorce decree had 
awarded spousal support, but awarded no interest in the pension plan from which the wife sought to 
recover an alimony arrearage. The husband's interest in the pension plan did not exist at the time of 
the divorce. The appellate court found that a post-divorce order awarding the wife $84,000 from the 
husband's pension plan was not a QDRO, but was instead an improper attempt to reopen and modify 
the divorce decree. Id. at 254. A QDRO, it held, must be consistent with the substantive provisions 
of the original decree and that statutory exception does not empower trial courts to make substantive 
modifications in the final divorce decree. Id. 
In this case, the parties were divorced in 2009. They specifically bypassed the court to enter 
into a separate contract outside of the decree, and outside of the court's jurisdiction. The contract 
was never entered as a spousal support order. In Idaho, the only way a retirement account protected 
under ERISA can be accessed is through a QDRO. The only way to qualify for a QDRO after 
divorce is to have a valid order for support, and a state law which provides a support order exception 
to retirement account funds. The first element of the requirements is not present here. There is no 
support order to enforce, only a civil contract. Linda is no more than a money judgment creditor. 
C. Appellant is Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal. 
James is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules and Idaho Code§ 12-121. In Crowley v. Critchfeld, 145 Idaho 509, 181 P.3d 435 (2007), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
Attorney's fees may also be awarded if the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 
185, 191, 125 P.3d 1061, 1067 (2005). I.C. § 12-121 grants the court the discretion to 
award attorney's fees. 
Id., 145 Idaho at 514. 
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James' appeal is brought pursuant to both statutory and settled case law. As such, Linda's 
defense to the appeal will have no basis in Idaho or Federal law. There is no statutory basis for the 
district court to affirm the magistrate court's granting of a QDRO to Linda. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, James Kesting respectfully requests this Court vacate the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 28"aay of August, 2014. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal was filed by Defendant/ Appellant James A. Kesting ("James") from the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("Order") entered on June 25, 2014 by the Honorable 
Patricia G. Young. His appeal challenges the legal basis for the entry of the Order. 
B. Procedural History 
Linda filed the original Complaint in this case on January 7, 2014 seeking $6,400 in 
unpaid spousal support owed under the parties Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement. James filed 
an Answer to the Complaint admitting he had breached the Alimony/Spousal Support agreement 
and admitting Linda was entitled to the relief she requested. Linda then moved for judgment on 
the pleadings and ultimately received an $8,000 judgment in her favor, plus attorney's fees and 
costs in the amount of $1,227.80. Subsequently, Linda obtained a Writ of Execution, which was 
returned unsatisfied. Linda then obtained a Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order on 
June 25, 2014, which directed that her judgments for unpaid spousal support and associated 
attorney's fees and costs be satisfied out of James' Terteling Employees Profit Sharing and Thrift 
Savings Plan 40l(k). This appeal followed. 
C. Statement of Facts 
This case concerns unpaid spousal support. Incident to James and Linda's divorce on July 
31, 2009, the parties entered into an Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement ("Agreement") on 
July 17, 2009. (Second Memorandum of Fees and Costs, filed July 2, 2014, Exhibit A). James 
agreed to pay Linda alimony/spousal support in the amount of $1,600 until the "death or 
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remarriage of Linda or the death of Jay." (Id.) In the Recitals section, the Agreement stated "The 
parties hereto on this date are stipulating to the entry of a Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
dissolving their marriage" and that "The parties have agreed that Jay shall pay to Linda spousal 
support/alimony as set forth hereinafter." (Id.) The Agreement also provided that 
alimony/spousal payment was non-modifiable and that the Agreement was a separate contract. 
(Id.) For its part, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce states in Paragraph 6 the following: 
"SPOUSAL SUPPORT: Spousal Support is governed by a separate contract between the parties 
which is not part of this Decree and is not modifiable by this court." (Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce, July, 31, 2009, p. 2, ,i 6).1 
After James failed to make several months of alimony payments started in October of 
2013, Linda filed suit for breach of the Agreement. (Plaintiffs Complaint, at pp. 1-2). James 
admitted in his Answer that he owed unpaid spousal support and was in breach of the 
Agreement. (Defendant's Answer, at ,i,il-3). Ultimately, Linda obtained an $8,000 judgment in 
her favor, plus attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,227.80. (Judgment entered February 
28, 2014; Judgment entered March 27, 2014) As an alimony creditor, Linda then sought to 
satisfy the judgment out of James's Terteling Employees Profit Sharing and Thrift 
1 Although the tenns of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce were repeatedly referenced below and on appeal, the 
actual document does not appear to be part of the trial court record. Linda has filed a Motion to Augment the Record 
with this document. 
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Savings 401(k), but her Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied. (Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Exh. A). Linda then filed a 
Motion for Entry of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, which the Court entered in June 25, 
2014. (Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order, June 25, 2014). This Order was pre-
approved by the Plan Administrator for James' 401(k). (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Exh. C). 
While post-judgment proceedings were still ongoing, Linda's counsel was provided with 
several documents.2 First, Linda was provided copies of James' tax returns, which show he has 
deducted his alimony payments to Linda. Second, Linda was provided a statement for James' 
401(k) showing a recent balance. Third, Linda was provided with a post-nuptial agreement 
executed by James and his current wife on June 30, 2014. (Declaration of Counsel in Support of 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum and Second Memorandum for Attorney's Fees, August 
18, 2014, at Exh. A). The list of James property in Exhibit B to the post-nuptial agreement 
consists solely of "One Craftsman Toolbox with tools and One Lot Power tools," and nothing 
else. (Id.) However, a 401(k) is listed in his current wife's schedule of assets.3 (Id.) 
2 Although these documents were not placed into the record in the proceedings below, Linda has filed a Motion to 
Augment the Record because these documents are relevant to James' arguments on appeal. 
3 Although this appears to be an attempt at a fraudulent transfer, it appears to be void as to a 40l(k) and likely had 
no effect on the ownership of the 40l(k), and therefore no effect on the posture of this appeal or the necessary 
parties. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Linda should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
Linda should be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to the 
Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement and Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. This appeal, 
just as the case below, concerns Linda's ongoing enforcement of her rights under the Agreement. 
Paragraph 3 of the Spousal Support Agreement states that "If action is required to enforce any of 
the provisions of this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of all attorney 
fees and costs." Here, the Court should affirm the Order, find that Linda is the prevailing party, 
and enforce the terms of the parties' Agreement by awarding Linda her attorney's fees and costs. 
III. ARGUMENT 
This case presents the Court with this question: Can an alimony creditor collect unpaid 
alimony from an ERISA-qualified retirement plan via a qualified domestic relations order that 
complies with ERISA 4 and Idaho law where the agreement to pay alimony was in a non-merged 
agreement entered into incident to divorce? The answer to this question is "yes." Alimony 
creditors can execute on otherwise exempt or anti-alienable assets like James' 401(k). See 29 
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); LC. § 11-607; and LC. § 11-604A(3). Both ERISA and Idaho law 
expressly permit the collection of spousal support arrearages against ERISA-qualified retirement 
plans, provided the collection is through a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") that 
complies with ERISA. The Magistrate Court's Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § I056(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
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("Order") issued in this case complied with ERISA and Idaho law and should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
James' primary argument to the contrary involves drawing an artificial distinction 
without a difference. James bends over backwards to avoid any use of the terms "alimony" or 
"spousal support" in his briefing, but there is no question Linda is owed unpaid alimony and is 
an alimony creditor. There is no meaningful distinction between an alimony creditor pursuant to 
an alimony agreement (like Linda) and an alimony creditor pursuant to a court order from the 
divorce court). Because of her status as an alimony creditor, both Idaho and federal law 
expressly permit Linda to attach assets that are otherwise exempt or shielded from attachment by 
ordinary creditors, provided a QDRO is utilized. 
In short, the Magistrate Court's Order complied with the definition of a "qualified 
domestic relations order" under ERISA. Courts across the country have consistently permitted 
spousal support judgments to be collected against ERISA-qualified plans, provided a QDRO is 
used. In fact, nothing in federal or state law prohibits alimony creditors from collecting 
judgments for unpaid alimony against ERISA-qualified plans-in fact, the contrary is true. 
Alimony creditors are favored under both Idaho and Federal law and are expressly permitted to 
collect against assets that are otherwise exempt or anti-alienable. 
Therefore, the Court should affirm the Magistrate Court's Order. 
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A. The Order meets ERISA's requirements for a qualified domestic relations 
order and was properly issued by the Magistrate Court 
The Order meets ERISA's requirements for a qualified domestic relations order and was 
properly issued by the Magistrate Court. First, under ERISA, there are two main uses for a 
QDRO. The most common use of a QDRO is to divide a retirement plan upon divorce. But 
QDRO's also can be used to satisfy judgments for spousal support arrearages. This is the 
conclusion of the vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Stinner v. 
Stinner, 554 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1989); (holding that an alimony judgment arising out of breach of an 
alimony contract could be enforced via a QDRO); Hogle v. Hogle, 732 N.E.2d 1278 (Ind. 2000) 
(holding that a QDRO can be used to garnish a 'retirement plan to satisfy past due support 
obligations); Rife v. Rife, 529 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1995) (holding that ERISA was not a bar to 
enforcing support claim against pension plan); Baird v. Baird, 843 S.W.2d 388 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1992) (holding that QDRO can be used to enforce delinquent support obligations); In re 
Marriage of Thomas, 789 N.E.2d 821, 831 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (agreeing with the "quantum of 
persuasive authority" permitting use of a QDRO to assign retirement benefits to satisfy past due 
maintenance and child support obligations); see also Gary A. Shulman, Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order Handbook, § 1.04 (3rd Ed. 2007) ("QDROs are useful not only in divorce 
situations. QDROs can also be utilized for child support or spousal support purposes, including 
the collection of past-due child support or spousal support arrearages."). 
Second, a QDRO can properly be used to satisfy a spousal support arrearage when the 
spousal support is pursuant to a non-modifiable contract entered into incident to divorce. There is 
no basis to draw the distinction that James repeatedly draws in his briefing. Linda is owed 
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alimony pursuant to agreement. She is no less and no more an alimony creditor than any former 
spouse owed alimony under a divorce decree or court order. Whether Linda can satisfy her 
judgment for unpaid alimony against James' 40l(k) turns primarily on whether the Order she 
obtained from the Magistrate Court complies with federal law, specifically the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 
ERISA is a comprehensive federal law governing certain retirement accounts. The parties 
in this case do not dispute that ERISA applies to James' 401(k). ERISA has a general anti-
alienation provision that states the following: "Each pension plan shall provide that benefits 
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l). However, 
this anti-alienation provision has a key exception, which is that qualified domestic relations 
orders (QDROs) can be used to access otherwise un-assignable or anti-alienable assets. This is 
because ERISA goes on to state that the anti-alienation provision quoted above "shall not apply 
if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). 
Further, ERISA affirmatively requires that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide for the payment of 
benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations 
order." Id. Therefore, ERISA does not bar the assignment or alienation of benefits in James 
40l(k) because the Order Linda obtained is a qualified domestic relations order. 
Under ERISA, a domestic relations order "means any judgment, decree, or order 
(including approval of a property settlement agreement) which - (I) relates to the provision of 
child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or 
other dependent of a participant, and (II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law 
(including community property law). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(II). If the Order in this 
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case is domestic relations order, the Order must also be "qualified" under 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(3)(B)(i). However, whether the Order is qualified was not disputed or argued below and 
is not challenged or otherwise at issue on this appeal. The only issue is whether the Order is a 
"domestic relations order" under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(l)-(II). 
James argues without citation to any authority that there must have been a spousal 
support order for support in the 2009 divorce in order for the Order to be valid. This not only 
ignores ERISA's plain text, it ignores a key piece of Idaho domestic relations law, that of non-
merged, non-modifiable alimony agreements. Further, there is no legal authority-and James 
cites none-that says if party enters into a separate, non-merged alimony contract, that party 
cannot later obtain a QDRO and seek to collect the unpaid alimony against otherwise exempt or 
anti-alienable assets. What James misses is that the qualified domestic relations order at issue 
here is the Order the Magistrate Court issued. The fact that there never was a court order for 
alimony entered in the 2009 divorce is irrelevant. The only relevant question is whether the 
Order in this case complies with ERISA. It does. 
(1) Relates to Alimony Payments. 
First, the Order must "relate" to "alimony payments" to a former spouse. 29 U.S.C. § 
1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I). Here, there is no question that the Order relates to alimony payments to a 
former spouse. James appears to take the perplexing position that the payments due under the 
Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement, which terminate upon the death or remarriage of Linda 
and which Agreement was entered into incident to a divorce, are not alimony or spousal support 
payments. For example, James repeatedly refers to the Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement as a 
"standard payment contract" (Appellant's Br. at 5) or a "civil contract" (Id. at 1) or a "separate 
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settlement contract" (Id.). James consistently refers to the payments as mere "monthly payments" 
(Id. at 6) and Linda as being a "money judgment creditor" (Id. at 1 ). He calls the title of the 
Alimony/ Spousal Support Agreement "irrelevant" (Id. at 3). 
James' position is all the more perplexing considering that James deducted his payments 
as alimony on his tax returns. 5 There is no question that James owed alimony and breached an 
agreement to pay alimony. There is certainly no question that his payments qualified under 26 
U.S.C. § 71, which defines alimony and separate maintenance for federal tax purposes. Under 
that Code provision an "alimony or separate maintenance payment" must ( among other things) 
be a cash payment received "under a divorce or separation instrument" without any "liability to 
make any such payment for any period after the death of the payee spouse." 26 U.S.C. § 
7l(b)(l)(A) & (D). The Agreement here provides for both. James' position is also surprising 
considering he admitted that he failed to make spousal support payments. (Defendant's Answer, 
at ,r,rl-3). James' position apparently is the payments are alimony when it comes to tax time, but 
not alimony when it comes to the law's favored treatment of a former spouse owed alimony. It is 
James, not Linda, who is playing "fast and loose" with the courts (and the IRS). 
There is no question that the Order the Magistrate Court entered related to alimony 
payments. James nonetheless attempts to draw a distinction under ERISA for alimony payments 
by court order and alimony payments by agreement. He argues-again, without any citation to 
authority-that a QDRO must relate to a "valid support order" (Appellant's Br. at 7). First, this 
alters the plain meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(l), which states the order must only 
5 Linda has filed a separate Motion to Augment the Record to include the tax returns. 
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relate to alimony payments. James' argument is based on his own rewrite of the statute. Non-
merged alimony contracts have never been treated as second class citizens or any differently 
from alimony orders--certainly, the IRS views them no differently. Linda is not a mere money 
judgment creditor and never was. 
There is no authority supporting James' distinction. In fact, there is authority otherwise. 
In Stinner v. Stinner, 554 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1989), the beneficiary of an alimony agreement filed suit 
to collect unpaid alimony owed pursuant to a contract. After obtaining a judgment, she then 
sought a writ of execution against a pension plan. The court ruled that the alimony judgment she 
obtained was a qualified domestic relations order. It was (1) an order of the court; (2) that related 
to the decisional domestic relations law that upheld alimony contracts entered into in 
contemplation of divorce; and (3) it related to alimony payments. The Stinner court expressly 
rejected the argument that a QDRO was impermissible just because the alimony was agreed to in 
a contract. 554 A.2d at 47-48. 
Therefore, the Order relates to alimony payments and meets that requirement of ERIS A. 
(2) Is Made Pursuant to a State Domestic Relations Law. 
Not only does the Order relate to alimony payments, it was also made pursuant to Idaho's 
domestic relations law. Idaho's domestic relations law has a long tradition of recognizing and 
upholding separate contracts for alimony that are not merged into divorce decrees, but are 
entered into incident to divorce. See, e.g., Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 230, 296 P.3d 
433, 436 (Ct. App. 2013); Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 393-94, 957 P.2d 1387, 1391-92 
(1998); Spencer-Steedv. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338,344, 766 P.2d 1219, 1225 (1988); Roesbery v. 
Roesbery, 88 Idaho 514, 521, 401 P.2d 805, 809 (1965); Kimball v. Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 16, 
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356 P.2d 919, 922 (1960); Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 75 Idaho 13, 23-24, 265 P.2d 662, 669 
(1954); Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 444-45, 958 P.2d 599, 601--02 (Ct. App. 1998). 
These agreements are reached in order to avoid the future modification of the alimony 
payment, which is permitted with a court order for alimony (provided there is shown a 
substantial change in circumstances). That is the main reason family law practitioners counsel for 
or against separate alimony contracts. As set forth above, these contracts create obligations to 
pay alimony-they are not mere agreements to make "monthly payments," as James suggests 
throughout his briefing. Therefore, Linda's right to alimony is grounded in Idaho's decisional 
domestic relations law-her concomitant right to enforce the judgments for unpaid alimony via 
the Magistrate Court's Order is likewise grounded in Idaho's decisional domestic relations law. 
Further, James' argument was expressly rejected by the one court that has addressed the 
"contract versus order" argument that James makes. The Stinner court rejected the lower court's 
finding that the former spouse's right to alimony "was based solely on contract and not the 
domestic relations law" of Pennsylvania, and hence could not be a qualified domestic relations 
order. The court ruled this was a "myopic view of the word law." 554 A.2d at 48. Recognizing 
that these agreements were a part of Pennsylvania's decisional domestic relations law, the 
Stinner court noted the definition of State law under ERISA, which includes "all laws, decisions, 
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." 554 A.2d at 48 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § l 144(c)(l)). The court ultimately found that because the agreement for 
alimony was found upon Pennsylvania's decisional domestic relations law, upon its breach, the 
court could issue QDRO, and that QDRO was pursuant to the same domestic relations law that 
permitted the alimony agreement in the first place. Id. 
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Same result here. The Magistrate Court has the jurisdiction to enforce alimony 
agreements. Because the Agreement was founded on Idaho's decisional domestic relations law, 
so too is the Magistrate Court's Order. To find otherwise would carve out a whole class of 
alimony creditors and relegate them to a second-class status-a result directly contrary to the 
favored status of alimony creditors under ERISA and Idaho law. There is no authority for such a 
result. 
B. Idaho law expressly permits Linda to collect against James' 401(k) 
Although the primary issue in this case is one of federal law, Idaho law also supports 
Linda's position in this matter. Consistent with ERISA, there is no bar under Idaho law to Linda 
collecting alimony against James' retirement plan-in fact, alimony creditors are given favored 
treatment. LC.§ 11-607(1)(a)(l) expressly states that a creditor "can make a levy against exempt 
property to enforce a claim for 1. Alimony, support, or maintenance .... " LC.§ 11-607(1)(a)(l). 
James argues in a footnote that LC. § 11-607(1)(a)(l) is not applicable and that LC. § 11-
604A(3) governs. This is because LC. § 11-607(1) states "notwithstanding other provisions of 
this act ... " and LC.§ 11-604A was not part of the same "act." This argument ignores that when 
LC.§ 11-604A(3) was enacted, LC.§ 11-607 was on the books, yet was never amended. In other 
words, if James is correct that LC. 11-604A(3) was meant to protect his 401(k) from alimony 
creditors, it would be odd that the Legislature would leave LC. § 11-607 undisturbed. This 
argument reflects an unduly narrow interpretation of term "act" that would require an 
understanding of each particular session law or amendment that comprises Title 11 and when 
each was enacted. This would force a disjointed reading of Title 11, as well as every other statute 
that contains the same phrase. Instead, the proper rule is to read the two statutes in pari materia. 
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See City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003). 
Statutes are inpari materia "if they relate to the same subject." Id at 69, 72 P.3d at 909. Statutes 
that are in pari materia "must be construed together to effect legislative intent." Id. 
Here, I.C. § 11-604A(3) and I.C. § 11-607 are in harmony and support Linda's position. 
I.C. § 11-604A(3) states that while pensions are exempt from execution, that protection does not 
apply to benefits payable to a former spouse ''to the extent expressly provided for in a qualified 
domestic relations order that meets the requirements for those orders under the plan .... " I.C. § 
11-604A(3). While James admits that the "statute does allow for the use of a QDRO along the 
same lines as the federal law," James then misreads the rest of the statute to claim the exemption 
in the statute only applies ''to the extent provided in any order issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction that provides for maintenance or support." Although the Order in this case would 
still qualify under this definition, this part of the statute is not applicable to the retirement plan at 
issue here, which the parties have never disputed is a 401(k) plan. (See e.g., James' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Order, filed 
June 20, 2014, at p. 2). A correct reading of I.C. § 11-604A(3) shows that this section of the 
statute is phrased in the disjunctive. The statute states: 
This subsection shall permit benefits under any such plan or arrangement to be 
payable to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant in 
the plan to the extent expressly provided for in a qualified domestic relations 
order that meets the requirements for those orders under the plan, or, in the case 
of benefits payable under a plan described in sections 403(b), 408, 408A or 457 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or section 409 of the Internal 
Revenue Code as in effect before January 1, 1984, to the extent provided in any 
order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that provides for maintenance or 
support. 
I.C. § 11-604A(3) (emphasis added). 
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The italicized portion of section (3) is what applies here. The placement of the word "or" 
shows that the final sentence is only applicable to plans described in sections 403(b ), 408, 408A, 
or 457 of the Internal Revenue Code. James' plan is not under any of these sections. Rather, no 
one disputes that James' Plan is under section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Therefore, I.C. 11-604A(3) permits Linda to collect her unpaid alimony against James' 
401(k). Linda has obtained a qualified domestic relations order. The Plan Administrator has 
already approved the Order and confirmed it meets the requirements for those orders under the 
plan. 1.C. § 11-607(1)(a)(l) expressly states that alimony creditors can garnish assets that are 
otherwise exempt under other provisions of the act. These statutes should be read in harmony. 
Read together, alimony creditors like Linda are authorized to obtain QDRO's to levy against 
otherwise exempt retirement assets like those at issue here. Idaho law not only permits it, but 
actually favors the collection of alimony in this situation. 
C. The Order is not a modification of the 2009 divorce decree 
The Order entered by the Magistrate Court is not an impermissible modification of the 
2009 divorce decree. James cites in support of this position is DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 
637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) and Hoy v. Hoy, 510 S.E.2d 253 (Va. 1999). DeSantis had nothing 
to do with spousal support arrearages and Hoy has been widely criticized and reflects the (tiny) 
minority position. First, DeSantis involved an equalization payment, not a spousal support 
arrearage. In the divorce, the parties were each awarded their pensions and wife was ordered to 
make an equalization payment. When she failed to do so, the husband sought to execute on her 
pension. The Court ruled that created an interest in an asset the final judgment extinguished. 
What is different here is that not only does Linda have a judgment for unpaid alimony, the asset 
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here is a 401(k) as opposed to a pension. Further, even if DeSantis were correct, the logic of the 
decision would only extend to the 401(k) balance in the account at the time of divorce, and not 
future growth or contributions, which never existed at the time of the divorce.6 In any event, 
DeSantis is against the majority of the decisions across the country that have addressed the issue. 
James' reliance on Hoy is also misplaced. In Hoy, the party seeking the QDRO obtained a 
judgment for unpaid alimony in the amount of $84,000 some 12 years after the divorce. There 
was no state statute in effect at the time that contemplated the entry of qualified domestic 
relations order, unlike in Idaho. The court ruled that a QDRO was an impermissible modification 
of the divorce decree. Hoy is not only factually distinguishable, it has been widely criticized and 
reflects the minority position on this issue. See, e.g., Hogle, 732 N.E.2d at 1283-84 (rejecting 
Hoy's reasoning in favor of the majority position that a QDRO can be used to enforce support 
arrearages); Michael P. Boulette, Collecting Child Support and Maintenance: A New Role for 
ODROs, 69 Bench & Bar of Minn. 20, 22 (Oct. 2012) (noting that the use of QDROs to enforce 
past due support has "received increasing approval across the country" and that "the reasoning 
employed by the Virginia court in Hoy does not appear to have gained wide acceptance"); Laura 
W. Morgan, Using ODROs to Enforce Spousal and Child Support, 13 No. 1 Divorce Litig. 7 
(Jan.2001) ("Congress has made it clear that QDROs may be used to enforce spousal and child 
support obligations. To do so is not an impermissible modification of a property division award, 
but only a means of enforcement of an obligation. It is time Virginia reversed the Hoy decision 
and got with the program."). 
6 As noted above, Linda has filed a Motion to Augment the Record to include a recent 40l(k) statement and the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Comparison of these shows the growth in James' 40l(k) since the divorce. 
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Therefore, not only is James' authority unpersuasive, he cites no persuasive authority that 
suggests that collecting a judgment against property awarded to an ex-spouse in a divorce decree 
is somehow a modification of the decree. Not only is there no persuasive authority for this 
position, James' argument that this is a modification of the property settlement agreement is 
logically flawed. Under James' reasoning, a party could immediately default on support 
obligations after divorce and then argue he or she is judgment proof because the only assets 
available to satisfy the judgment were awarded to them in the decree. There is no support for this 
result, which is actually contrary to the special position granted to alimony and child support 
creditors under Idaho law. 
At heart, James is arguing to the Court that he can default on the obligation he assumed 
as part of the divorce settlement, but then shield his assets from collection because they were 
awarded to him in the Decree. The Court should reject this reasoning, just as the Magistrate 
Court rejected it. Linda is not seeking to alter or modify the initial property division, but is 
seeking to satisfy a judgment for unpaid alimony against property that is non-exempt under 
Idaho and federal law. It would be strange if the Idaho Legislature specifically provided that 
retirement plans are non-exempt as to alimony claims when this benefit would be essentially 
meaningless because most of these collection actions would entail impermissible post-divorce 
property modifications. 
D. James is not entitled to his attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
James argues that his appeal is "brought pursuant to both statutory and settled case law" 
and that therefore Linda's defense will not be. James therefore seeks fees under I.C. § 12-121 for 
frivolousness. Oddly, James does not request fees pursuant to the Alimony/Spousal Support 
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Agreement. This is consistent with his approach throughout this case, one of soft-pedaling or 
ignoring the alimony agreement. In fact, Linda has prevailed throughout this litigation and her 
defense of this appeal is well-supported by the facts and the law. There is no basis for James to 
be awarded fees under I.C. § 12-121. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be affirmed. 
DATED this ;;l. S day of September, 2014. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant restates, and by this reference incorporates, the section of Appellant's Opening 
Brief entitled, ''Nature of the Case," as ifit were set forth fully herein. 
B. Factual Background and Procedural History 
Appellant restates, and by this reference incorporates, the section of Appellant's Opening 
Brief entitled. "Factual Background and Procedw-al History," as ifit were set forth fully herein. 
Il. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Judge Young erred as a matter oflaw by treating James and Linda Kesting's 
separate civil contract as a Spousal Support Order; 
2. Whether Judge Young erred as a matter of law by granting a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order to a money judgment creditor in violation of state and federal law; 
and, 
3. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney costs and fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 
and 12-1.23. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a District Judge considers an appeal from a Magistrate Judge, the District Judge is 
acting as an Appellate Court, not as a Trial Court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 
1308 (1992); I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l). Accordingly, the standards ofreview are the same as those applied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeal in a regular appeal: the District Court upholds the 
lower courfs factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence; 
and affirms conclusions oflaw which demonstrate proper application oflegal principles to the facts 
found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194 (Ct. App. 1988). Where issues on appeal involve 
questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review. Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 
120 Idaho 18S, 814 P.2d 917 (1991). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Non-merged agreements are not equivalent to court orders. 
Both ERISA and Idaho law expressly permit the collection of spousal support arrearages 
against ERISA-qualified retirement plans, provided the collection is through a qualified domestic 
relations order ("QDRO") that complies with ERISA. If James and Linda had merged the separate 
agreement into the 2009 decree, it would be a court order for alimony and Linda would be able to 
collect delinquent payments via a QDRO; but, that is not the case here. 
Linda claims that "A QDRO can properly be used to satisfy a spousal support arrearage when 
the spousal support is pursuant to a non-modifiable contract entered into incident to divorce." 
(Respondent's Brief at p. 6). Yet, Linda provides no case law or citations to support that statement. 
Instead, established case law supports just the opposite; non-merged agreements are subject to 
contract law, and are not considered alimony orders. See, Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 393-94, 
957 P.2d 1387, 1391-92 (1998); Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338, 344t 766 P.2d 1219, 
1225 (1988); Roesbery v. Roesbery, 88 Idaho 514, 521, 401 P.2d 805, 809 {1965); Kimball v. 
Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 16,356 P.2d 919,922 (1960); Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 75 Idaho 13, 23-24, 
265 P.2d 662, 669 (1954); Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 4421 444-45, 958 P.2d 599, 601-02 
(Ct.App.1998). 
Linda claims, ''the fact that there was never a court order for alimony entered in the 2009 
divorce is irrelevant. The only relevant question is whether the Order in this case complies with 
BRISA." (Respondent's Brief at p, 8), These two statements are wholly inoorrect. First, whether 
there is a valid alimony order from the 2009 divorce is very relevant. Second, whether the QDRO 
entered by Honorable Judge Young, based on a generic judgment, meets the standard of ERISA is 
not relevant unless we get past the first question of whether there is even a valid alimony order from 
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a court to enforce. In this case, there is not. The agreement between the parties was a separate non-
merged contract, which, therefore, never became an alimony order as required to qualify for an 
exception under ERISA's anti.-alienation provisions. 
Linda states, "There is no meaningful distinction between an alimony creditor pursuant to an 
alimony agreement (like Linda) and an alimony creditor pursuant to a court order from the divorce 
court." (Respondent's Brief at p. S). Linda calls herself an "alimony creditor" and, as such, she is 
expressly permitted to attach assets that are otherwise exempt or shielded from attachment by 
ordinary creditors. This is not true, however, because as explained above, there is no alimony order. 
B. Idaho Code Section 11-607 does not preclude ll-604A. 
Under state law, which is consistent with federal law, it Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
for child support or alimony is required to access exempt retirement funds. See, I.C. § 1 l-604A. In 
her response brief, Linda conti:r;iues to argue that I. C. § 11-607 is the appropriate statute_ and that the 
two statutes (I.C. § ll.-604A and I.C. § 11-607) are inpari material. (Respondent's Brief atp. 13). 
As argued in Appellant's Brief at p. 8, LC. § 11-607 specifically states that it only governs claims 
against exempt property "notwithstanding other provisions of this act." I.C. § 11-604A is not part of 
the act. Idaho Code§ 11-607 was passed in 1978. I.C. § 11-604A was passed in 1996 and was, 
therefore, not a provision of the 1978 act. The "Statement of Purpose" provided in the legislative 
notes for l.C. § l l-604A states: 
"Federal Law exempts pension plans from legal process, but does not include 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) in the exemption. Certain individuals have 
been required to roll over pension funds into an IRA and such nmds could be 
vulnerable to attaclunent in court actions without this exemption. Several states 
already have this exemption which is provided for in this legislation." 
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS-ATTACHMENT AND LEVY-EXE:MPTIONFOR 
PENSION FUNDS ROLLED INTO INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS, 1996 
Idaho Laws Ch. 309 (H.B. 751). 
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From that statement of purpose two things are clear. First, that the legislature acknowledges 
that federal law preempts state law in regards to exempt pension plans. Secondly, that the legislature 
intended to e,ctend the exemption in regards to retirement plans by adding I.C. § 11~604A. 
C. Fo.-m of QDRO not at issue. 
Linda argues that she is entitled to James' exempt retirement funds because she obtained a 
QDRO and because the Plan Administrator approved the QDRO. James does not contest whether the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order filed by Linda conforms to the administrative requirements of 
the specific qualified plan. Plan Administrators approve or disapprove a QDRO based on form, not 
whether it is provided for by law. Rather, James asserts that where there is a non-merged, separate 
agreement between parties, it does not result in an alimony order, and therefore a QDRO is not 
allowed under either state or federal law because there is no underlying alimony order. In this case, 
the Magistrate Judge incorrectly granted a QDRO based on no underlying alimony order from the 
original divorce decree, and a generic money judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, James Kesting respectfully requests this Court vacate the Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. 
DA TED this J__b__ "ftay of October, 2014. 
Attomeys for Appellant 
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Case No. CV-OC-2014-00258 
OPINION ON APPEAL 
______________ ) 
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: C. TOM ARKOOSH 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT: STANLEY W. WELSH 
James Kesting appeals from a decision by a magistrate concerning entry of a 
"judgment of qualified domestic relations order." 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The following is derived from Linda's brief and appears to be undisputed: 
Linda filed the original Complaint in this case on January 7, 2014 seeking 
$6,400 in unpaid spousal support owed under the parties' 
Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement. James filed an Answer to the 
Complaint admitting he had breached the Alimony/Spousal Support 
agreement and admitting Linda was entitled to the relief she requested. 
Linda then moved for judgment on the pleadings and ultimately received 
an $8,000 judgment in her favor, plus attorney's fees and costs in the 
amount of $1,227.80. Subsequently, Linda obtained a Writ of Execution, 
which was returned unsatisfied. Linda then obtained a Judgment of 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order on June 25, 2014, which directed that 
her judgments for unpaid spousal support and associated attorney's fees 
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• 
and costs be satisfied out of James' Terteling Employees Profit Sharing 
and Thrift Savings Plan 401 (k). This appeal followed. Respondent's Brief, 
at 1. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge, not involving 
a trial de novo, the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. 
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of 
law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 
134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). "'The magistrate's findings of fact 
will be upheld if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence."' Hoskinson 
v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 1049, 1055 (2003). 
ISSUES 
James asserts the following issues in this appeal: (1) "[w]hether Judge Young 
erred as a matter of law by treating James and Linda Kesting's separate civil contract as 
a Spousal Support Order;" (2) "Whether Judge Young erred as a matter of law by 
granting a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to a money judgment creditor in violation 
of state and federal law;" and (3) "Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney costs and 
fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-123."1 Appellant's Brief, at 2. 
1. Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
James contends that the magistrate erred in issuing the "judgment of qualified 
domestic order," under the circumstances. 
11n the argument section of his brief, James argues he "is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Code § 12-121. Appellant's Brief, at 1 O. The court will 
consider this as his actual request since it appears to be more applicable and since it is asserted in the 
argument section of his brief. 
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The judgment and decree of divorce stated "SPOUSAL SUPPORT: Spousal 
support is governed by a separate contract between the parties which is not part of 
this Decree and is not modifiable by this court." Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
(July 31, 2009), at 2. (emphasis in original, except bold emphasis added). 
The "alimony/spousal support agreement" provides: 
1. PAYMENT OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT/ALIMONY: Jay shall pay to Linda 
alimony/spousal support in the amount of $1,400 every two weeks 
commencing on June 11, 2009 and payable every other Thursday 
thereafter (i.e. in June 2009 Jay shall pay support of June 11th and June 
25th, in July 2009 he will pay support on July 9th and July 23rd and shall 
continue to pay every other Thursday). 
Provided, however, on the first day of the month after the closing of the 
sale of the residence located at 1399 North Watson, Eagle, Idaho, the 
spousal support/alimony payment shall change to the amount of $1,600 
paid on the first day of each month. 
Provided, further, the spousal support/alimony payments shall terminate 
immediately upon the death or remarriage of Linda or the death of Jay. 
2. MODIFICATION: Neither party shall have the right to request that 
any court modify the alimony/spousal support payments. This shall remain 
a separate contract and does not constitute a court order. 
Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement, at 1 (emphasis in original). 
This action was initiated by a complaint filed by Linda seeking to enforce the 
terms of the contract. See Complaint, at 1. "The parties entered into a contract requiring 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff alimony/spousal support ... Pursuant to the terms of their 
contract, Defendant is obligated to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,600 on the first day of 
each month." 
"When a spousal support obligation arises only from a settlement agreement, the 
right to enforce the spousal support obligation rests on the contract. However, when a 
settlement agreement is incorporated, or 'merged,' into a divorce decree, the agreement 
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becomes enforceable only as a part of the decree, and not as a separate contract." 
Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 230, 296 P.2d 433, 436 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations 
omitted). 
'"The proper analysis is to look first only to the four corners of the divorce decree. 
If the language of the decree clearly and unambiguously holds the property settlement 
agreement is not merged, the inquiry is at an end. The court's inquiry will move beyond 
the four corners of the decree to the property settlement agreement only when the 
decree is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations."' 154 
Idaho at 231, 296 P.3d at 437. 
The divorce decree, recounted above, is unambiguous. The spousal support 
obligation was not merged with the divorce decree. Therefore, the right to enforce the 
spousal support obligations rests on the contract. 
"A QDRO [qualified domestic relations order] is a domestic relations order made 
pursuant to a state domestic relations law, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II), which 
'creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to, or 
assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable 
with respect to a participant of the plan,' 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) and 'relates to 
the provision of . . . alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former 
spouse ... .' 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I)." Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 92 n. 
7, 822 P.2d 982, 989 n. 7 (1991) (emphasis added). 
"Prior to 1984, ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] prohibited the 
alienation or assignment of pension plan benefits . . . In 1984, Congress amended 
ERISA by enacting the Retirement Equity Act ... which allowed a participant to alienate 
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or assign pension benefits under a domestic relations order so long as the order is 
'determined to be a qualified domestic relations order.' See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) .. 
. A 'domestic relations order' is defined as 'any judgment, decree, or order (including 
approval of a property settlement agreement) which relates to the provision of child 
support, alimony payments or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, or 
other dependent of a participant, and is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law 
(including community property law).' 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(l)-(II)." Green v. 
Green, 899 F.Supp.2d 291, 297-98 (D. N.J. 2012). 
"A valid ORO [domestic relations order] can be any judgment, decree, or order 
which (1) 'relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property 
rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant,' and (2) 'is 
made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.' 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)." 
Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010). 
The judgment of qualified domestic relations order issued here was not made 
pursuant to an Idaho domestic relations law. The spousal support agreement was not a 
part of the divorce decree, and Linda brought this as an action to enforce the contract. 
This judgment of domestic relations order was issued pursuant- to state contract 
law. The magistrate had no authority, in an action to enforce the contract, to impose the 
"QRDO ...... to satisfy pending judgments for alimony owed by the Participant to the 
Alternate Payee." Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order, at 1. Consequently, 
the magistrate erred in issuing this judgment of qualified domestic relations order. See 
Davidson, 154 Idaho at 232, 296 P.3d at 438: "Because the spousal support provision 
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of the parties' divorce settlement agreement was not merged into the divorce decree, it 
is enforceable in this action for breach of contract." 
Linda asserts that her "right to alimony is grounded in Idaho's decisional 
domestic relations law-her concomitant right to enforce the judgments for unpaid 
alimony via the Magistrate Court's Order is likewise grounded in Idaho's decisional 
domestic relations law." Respondent's Brief, at 11. However, she has cited no specific 
authority for this assertion.2 I.C. § 32-705 provides no absolute right to spousal support. 
Rather, section 32-705 specifies that spousal support can be ordered when the court 
finds that the specified conditions have been satisfied.3 The federal statute requires the 
qualified domestic relations order be "based upon a state domestic relations law." 
Neither Linda nor the magistrate point to a specific state domestic relations law that is 
applicable here. 
2See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) ("The argument shall contain the 
[party's] contentions with respect to the issues presented ... the reasons therefor, with citations to 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied upon."); I.A.R. 35(a)(6); City of Boise 
v. Bench Sewer District, 116 Idaho 25, 26 n.1, 773 P.2d 642, 643 n. 1 (1988) (issue not fully briefed or 
argued is deemed abandoned). 
31.C. § 32-705 ("Maintenance") provides: 
1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance order if it finds that the 
spouse seeking maintenance: (a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her 
reasonable needs; and (b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment. 
2.The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time that the 
court deems just, after considering all relevant factors which may include: (a) The 
financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, including the marital property 
apportioned to said spouse, and said spouse's ability to meet his or her needs 
independently; (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to 
enable the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment; (c) The duration of the 
marriage; (d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking 
maintenance; (e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his 
or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; (f) The tax 
consequences to each spouse; (g) The fault of either party. 
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Linda cites Stinner v. Stinner, 520 Pa. 374, 554 A.2d 45 (1989), in her brief in 
support of her argument. Respondent's Brief, at 10. That case holds that a "property 
settlement agreement, which provided, among other things, that ... Mr. Stinner would 
pay Mrs. Stinner alimony in specified sums for the rest of her natural life or until she 
remarried,"4 could be the basis for a qualified domestic relations order. However, "[t]he 
decision does not indicate that the agreement was incorporated in the divorce decree in 
any manner"5 and the court finds the Stinner court's reasoning, based upon an 
interpretation of Pennsylvania law, not persuasive here. As previously noted above, in 
Idaho, "[w]hen a spousal support obligation arises only from a settlement agreement, 
the right to enforce the spousal support obligation rests on the contract." Davidson, 154 
Idaho at 230, 296 P.2d at 436.6 
The parties disagree over whether or not Idaho law allows a money judgment to 
be satisfied by attaching or garnishing a party's assets in a 401 (k) plan. See, e.g., 
Appellant's Brief, at 8-10; Respondent's Brief, at 12-16. However, the court need not 
decide this issue because the judgment at issue is the "judgment of qualified domestic 
relations order."7 The court's "discussion of the [money judgment] issue would resolve 
4554 A.2d at 47. 
5Hogle v. Hogle, 732 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
6"An agreement providing for spousal support payments cannot ordinarily be modified by the court unless 
the terms of the agreement were incorporated or merged into the divorce decree. When the settlement 
agreement has been merged into the decree, support provisions in the agreement may be modified 
without the mutual consent of the parties because the agreement has become part of the court's 
judgment; absent merger, the agreement stands independent of the decree, and the obligations imposed 
under the agreement are not those imposed by decree but by contract." Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 
444-45, 958 P.2d 599, 601-02 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
7See, e.g., Notice of Appeal (July 10, 2014), at 2 ("This appeal is taken from the Judgment of Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order filed on June 25, 2014, confirming Judgment, dated March 27, 2014."). 
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no actual controversy. We decline to issue advisory opinions." Carr v. Carr, 108 Idaho 
684,690, 701 P.2d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 1985). 
2. Attorney Fees 
James seeks attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. "Attorney fees 
under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court if the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 
Kinghorn v. Clay, 153 Idaho 462,283 P.3d 779, 785 (2012) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)). 
"Fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not awarded to a prevailing party as a matter of 
right but, rather, are subject to the district court's discretion. A district court should only 
award fees 'when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, 
or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.' However, 'when a party 
pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to 
be frivolous and without foundation.' A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because 
the district court concludes that it fails as a matter of law. Furthermore, 'a misperception 
of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the 
question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious 
that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."' See Garner v. 
Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 467-68, 259 P.3d 608, 613-14 (2011). 
While James is the prevailing party, Linda's defense in this appeal, which 
concerns an issue for which there is no published Idaho appellate case directly on point, 
was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. James' request for attorney fees 
is, therefore, denied. 
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Linda is not the prevailing party, and the court has found that issuance of the 
judgment of qualified domestic relations order was not proper. Her request for attorney 
fees on appeal will not be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the magistrate court issuing the judgment of qualified domestic 
relations order is reversed. The requests of both parties for attorney fees on appeal are 
denied. 
Dated this~ iday of December 2014. 
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